Taxation -- Effects of Federal Taxes on Partnership  Buy and Sell  Agreements Funded by Life Insurance by Dortch, John J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 33 | Number 2 Article 16
2-1-1955
Taxation -- Effects of Federal Taxes on Partnership
"Buy and Sell" Agreements Funded by Life
Insurance
John J. Dortch
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




XVI, Section 1600 et seq. of the Machinery Act29 might be amended
to include airlines, so as to allow state assessment and certification of
apportioned value to local units for taxation.
THIRD: A special statute might be enacted specifically to encom-
pass the flight equipment of airlines operating in and through North
Carolina °  Such a statute should (1) require central assessment by
a state board or agency, (2) include a formula by which to determine
apportioned value allocable to this state, and (3) provide for central
collection of taxes and distribution thereof to local authorities. The
Nebraska statute3 ' would be a valuable model for such an act because
it is relatively simple and concise and because it has the sanction of
the United States Supreme Court in the Braniff case.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE.
Taxation-Effects of Federal Taxes on Partnership "Buy and Sell"
Agreements Funded by Life Insurance
In these days of high corporate taxes, many small and medium
sized businesses prefer to operate as partnerships, thus avoiding the
consequences of double taxation which are felt by closely held and
small family corporations. In assuming the partnership form, the
business associates are confronted with a problem with which cor-
porate organizations are not concerned. That is that under the gen-
eral law, upon the death of a partner, the partnership is automatically
dissolved, unless otherwise provided for in the partnership agreement.,
In case of dissolution, the surviving partners are trustees for the dece-
dent's partnership interests and are accountable to his estate. This
involves a valuation of the business and a possible sale of part or all
of the assets in order to pay the estate its due. Even if provisions
were made for continuance of the partnership, undoubtedly many a
profitable business would be wrecked by the incompatible interests
of the surviving partners and the decedent's representatives.
In order to solve this problem many partners have entered into
"buy and sell," or "survivor purchase," agreements during their life-
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-350 et seq. (1950)."There is no apparent reason why such a statute should not include the
trucks and busses of earth-bound carriers as well. Since the Machinery Act
does not provide specially for such property, it would seem that the sections
of that Act discussed in this note would be applicable to that property. Further-
more, in view of the number of highway carriers operating in this state, the
need for a special tax provision regarding such carriers seems even greater
than the need for such a provision applicable to airlines. However, the prob-
lems involved in the taxation of highway carriers are beyond the scope of this
note.
"NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1244 through 77-1250 (1950). See also ARIz. CODE
§ 73-2001 et seq. (Supp. 1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270.071 et seq. (1947).
'UNIFoR PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 31; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61 (1943).
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times, thereby assuring the survivor or survivors that they will acquire
the decedent's interest, and that the business will be carried on under
their control. Estate and income taxes cannot be ignored in drawing
up such an agreement, and care taken in drafting the instrument may
save the estate or the surviving partners many dollars in taxes. Another
purpose which the agreement should serve is to give the decedent's
interest a definite valuation, either by fixing a specific sum of money
or by setting out the method by which the interest is to be evaluated. 2
This will avoid any subsequent dispute between the survivors and the
decedent's executor and in addition may avoid protracted and costly
litigation with the government, by pegging the valuation for estate tax
purposes. Of course, the problem of valuation would not arise if a
partner sold his interest during his lifetime.
One problem which arises immediately is: How will the survivor
finance the purchase of the decedent's interest at the price agreed upon?
Because of present high rates of personal income taxes, it is difficult
for most individuals to accumulate and have on hand sufficient ready
cash to enable them to purchase a partner's interest. Therefore, other
methods of supplying purchase money must be found. It is here that
insurance on the partners' lives has come into frequent use in the last
thirty years. It provides the surviving partner a large sum of ready
cash tax free. In turn this cash may be urgently needed by the de-
cedent's personal representative to settle the estate, thus avoiding sale
of non-liquid assets. It is universally recognized that a partner has
an insurable interest in the life of a co-partner for this purpose, and
some states have passed statutes expressly so providing.a Several
plans and their variations are in use by partnerships, and all involve
the following common elements: (1) policies of life insurance will be
taken out on the partners' lives, the proceeds to be used for purchasing
the deceased partner's interest; (2) the agreement will limit the value
of the partner's interest; (3) an agreement is made by each partner
not to sell his partnership interest during his lifetime except to the
other partner or partners; (4) the agreement should be a bona fide
business transaction; and (5) the deceased partner's estate is legally
bound to sell the decedent's interest to the surviving partners.4
2For an excellent article on the different methods of valuation, see Forster,
Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agree-
inent, 4 STAr. L. REv. 325 (1952).8 E.g., N. C. GN. STAT. § 58-204.2 (Supp. 1953).
"Under Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, no capital gain
results to the decedent's estate upon the transfer of his interest under a binding
agreement because, upon death, the basis is changed from cost to fair market
value at the time of death. If the decedent's estate under the agreement gets
more than the fair market value of his interest, it is conceivable that it would
have to pay a capital gains tax on the excess.
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The value of the decedent's interest in the partnership for estate
tax purposes is limited to the value specified in the agreement, whether
it be a stated sum, book value at the time of death, or an amount
reached by any other method of valuation,5 but the interest is includ-
ible in his gross estate only to the extent it exceeds the sum received
as proceeds from the insurance policy." Had there been no binding
agreement not to sell during decedent's lifetime, then the full value
of his interest would be includible, but in any case that value is re-
ducible by the amount of insurance proceeds received. The transaction
must also be a bona fide business arrangement, not made with testa-
mentary intent to give some favored friend or relative the decedent's
interest at a cost below the fair market value. Thus in Claire Gianini
Hoffman v. Conmissioner the decedent had given his brother a uni-
lateral option to acquire his partnership interest upon his death at
twenty per cent of its value, but reserved the right to dispose of his
interest during his life. This option was assigned to the petitioner, the
optionee's sister. The petitioner contended that the value of the interest
was limited by the option agreement, but the Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner in including the full value of the interest in decedent's
gross estate, saying:
"We are of the opinion that while a bona fide contract, based
upon adequate consideration, to sell property for less than its
value may fix the value of the property for purposes of the estate
tax, a mere gratuitous promise to permit some favored individ-
ual, particularly the natural object of the bounty of the prom-
isor, to purchase it at a grossly inadequate price can have no
such effect.""
Where the taxpayer can successfully carry the burden of proving the
transaction was bona fide and at arm's length, the court has disregarded
the fact that the optionee or survivor who is receiving the interest at
a price below the market value is a natural object of decedent's boun-
ty.9 In any case where a bona fide transaction is found to exist, the
adequacy of the consideration must be measured at the time the con-
' Since the contract among the partners is specifically enforceable, the courts
have recognized that the mutual agreements are determinative of value, as
market value can be no more than the agreed price specifically enforceable by
the agreement. See Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1935); Estate of
Lionel Weil, 22 T. C. No. 158 (1954).
'The courts have held in many cases that it would be double taxation to
tax both the value of decedent's partnership interest and the consideration paid
for it. See Estate of Tompkins v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 1054 (1949).
72 T. C. 1160 (1943). See also Estate of Mathews v. Commissioner, 3 T. C.
525 (1944).
'Claire Gianini Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 1160, 1179 (1943).
' See Bensel v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 246 (1937), aff'd, 100 F. 2d 639
(3d Cir. 1938).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tract was entered into rather than the time the option was exercised.' 0
Each plan has different tax consequences and this note proposes
to explain the operation and the tax results of the most common of
these plans." The applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 are:
(1) the provisions of Section 2031, which deal generally with what
property is includible in a decedent's gross estate;
(2) the specific provisions of Section 2042, dealing with the in-
clusion of life insurance proceeds in decedent's gross estate
when they are payable to his estate or to other beneficiaries,
if the decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership;
(3) the provisions of Section 2043(a), covering transfers for insuf-
ficient consideration;
(4) the provisions of Section 101 and its subsections which con-
cern the treatment of life insurance proceeds in the income tax
field, where the deceased partner's estate has sold to the sur-
vivors the policies the decedent held on their lives.
The first plan we shall consider is the type in which the partner-
ship applies for the policies and pays for the premiums out of partner-
ship funds, but the insured in each case designates the first beneficiary
and reserves the right to change the beneficiary or any other right
incident to ownership of an insurance policy.', In this case the pro-
ceeds of the life insurance would be included in decedent's gross estate
under Section 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
says that the proceeds of those policies, "with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with another person," are
includible in his gross estate. But, as has been noted, his interest in
the partnership is not includible except as to the excess of its value
over the amount received as insurance.18
Under this first type of plan, there is a possible trap into which
the unwary partners may fall. In Legallet v. Commissioner4 the part-
nership paid the premiums on policies of insurance on the lives of the
two partners and charged their cost to the individuals equally. There
10 Ibid.
11 While this note deals with partnership interests, similar arrangements may
exist in the case of stockholders of closely held corporations, and the discus-
sions regarding the effects of such transactions are to a large extent applicable
to both situations. See Ness, Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements
and Options to Purchase Stock on Death, 49 CoL. L. Rxv. 796 (1949).
" A slight variation of this plan, with the same results, would be one in
which the partners individually apply for the insurance, but the premiums are
paid for with partnership funds.
"' See note 6 supra. 1441 B. T. A. 294 (1940).
[Vol. 33
1955] NOTES AND COMMENTS 315
was a binding agreement to the effect that the survivor would pur-
chase the interest of the one first to die, the proceeds from the in-
surance policy to be applied to the purchase price by the decedent's
estate. One partner designated his widow as the beneficiary of the
proceeds from the policy on his life, and upon his death she received
these proceeds from the insurance company. They went to her as
part payment of decedent's partnership interest, the survivor, Legallet,
giving his notes for the balance. Upon a subsequent sale of some of
the merchandise and accounts receivable of the partnership, Legallet
tried to include in his cost basis for income tax purposes the amount
which the beneficiary received as life insurance. The Tax Court agreed
with the Commissioner that Legallet had not paid for the insurance,
the premium payments by the partnership being attributed to the de-
cedent on the alter ego theory. Therefore, the survivor's basis was
only the actual amount he had paid in notes. But the court admitted
that had the survivor received the insurance proceeds himself, as bene-
ficiary, and then turned them over to the decedent's estate, the result
would have been different. Some writers, however, argue that the
same result would not be reached by the court today if the partner-
ship agreement clearly showed that it was a business arrangement, and
that the proceeds were intended to be part of the purchase price paid
by the survivor.'5 Others say that the partnership entity plan of pur-
chasing insurance should be used when there are more than two part-
ners because it is simpler, and the Legallet case would apply only if
and when a partner sells his partnership interest during his lifetime.' 6
The second type of plan to be considered is also one in which the
partnership applies for and takes out the insurance policy on each part-
ner's life and pays all premiums out of partnership funds, but differs
from the first plan in that the partnership designates itself as the bene-
ficiary-the partners as individuals having no right to change the
beneficiary, nor other incidents of ownership. The value of decedent's
interest is limited here also by the agreement if it is found to be a
bona fide transaction and if he was prohibited from selling to outsiders
during his lifetime. The difference between this plan and the first plan
is that here the insurance proceeds are not includible in decedent's
gross estate as such. They are only considered as a factor which in-
creases the value of his partnership interest, since in a similar case,
Atkins v. Commissioner,'7 it was held that the policies belonged to the
1 For some interesting arguments in favor of the entity approach to partner-
ship insurance in certain situations, see Forster, Entity Approach to Partner-
ship Isurance, 90 TRusTs AND EsTATEs 752 (1951).
See BowE, LIFs INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING 62-66 (Nash-
ville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1952).1f2 T. C. 332 (1943) ; cf. Doerken v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 809 (1942).
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partnership, and, therefore, the proceeds became an asset before they
were turned over to decedent's estate. Under the Regulations18 if the
decedent paid the premiums directly or indirectly, whether or not he
had any of the incidents of ownership, the proceeds are includible in
his gross estate. Although the decisions10 up to the present have held
that decedent did not pay for the insurance indirectly when the part-
nership paid the premiums, it is possible that a contrary decision will
be arrived at in the future under the alter ego theory. Such a decision
would be particularly applicable in a case where the decedent owned
substantially all the partnership.20 In this situation both the insurance
proceeds and the value of decedent's interest would be includible in his
gross estate, in which case the court's avowed policy of not taxing
both the interest and the consideration given for it would seem not
applicable since the decedent, being considered to have paid for the
insurance himself, the proceeds would not be consideration flowing
from the surviving partners. The dangers of the Legallet case dis-
cussed above are also present in this second plan.
The third and last type of plan to be considered is perhaps the
best for most partnerships under the present code and regulations.
2 '
Under this plan each partner applies for and takes out a policy on the
life of every other partner, pays the premiums out of his own pocket,
and reserves to himself all incidents of ownership, instead of having
the partnership entity do these things as in the second plan. The
major question presented under this "cross-insurance" plan is: Who
should be made the beneficiary of the policy? There are several pos-
sibilities, and each presents its own peculiar problems.
If the estate of the decedent is made the beneficiary, the proceeds
will be includible in the gross estate under Section 2042(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and since the value of decedents' in-
terest is limited according to the agreement, no additional estate tax
problems would be presented. The possible application of the rule
of the Legallet case should be forestalled, though, by the terms of a
prior written agreement which clearly states that each partner, not
the partnership, will pay the premiums on the policies he owns. Fur-
ther, some provision should be made which will bind the decedent's
personal representative to the purchase agreement. The terms of the
18 U. S. Treasury Regulations 105, § 81.27(a) (1) (1954).
"0Atkins v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 332 (1943); Estate of Tompkins v. Com-
missioner, 13 T. C. 1054 (1949).
2 "A decedent similarly pays the premiums or other consideration if pay-
ment is made by a corporation which is his alter ego or by a trust whose in-
come is taxable to him, as, for example, a funded insurance trust." U. S.
Treasury Regulation 105, § 81.27(a) (2) (1954).
'For a contrary argument in the case of a partnership consisting of many
members see Forster, Entity Approach to Partnership Inmirance, supra note 15.
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original agreement or a clause in the decedent's will directing his execu-
tor to carry out the agreement should accomplish this.
Another possible beneficiary is the wife of the decedent. Since her
husband did not pay for the insurance, and he had no incidents of own-
ership, the proceeds are not includible in his gross estate unless the
Commissioner changes his position in the future concerning applica-
tion of the Lehnmn cross transaction doctrine to partnership buy and
sell agreements.22 The full value of decedent's partnership interest as
limited by the prior agreement is includible in his gross estate. The
unpleasant possibility again arises that this arrangement may result in
the same income tax problem as was presented in the Legallet case,
although it could again probably be avoided by the terms of the bind-
ing prior agreement as above suggested. The Legallet case should
be distinguished on the ground that there was personal insurance, in-
stead of true business insurance. If it seems desirable to the partners,
the widow can be paid the proceeds in installments, instead of in one
lump sum. Each partner should retain the right, in the policy or
policies which he owns, to determine settlement options and bene-
ficiaries, but as a safeguard the policy should contain the provision
that the owner cannot change the settlement plan or beneficiary unless
he notifies his partners.2 3 This provision gives the partners a check
on each other and will not allow a plan to be defeated by a survivor.
Care should be exercised, though, not to give the husband of the bene-
ficiary any control or incidents of ownership in the policy. The hazards
of these settlement plans where decedent's wife is made the beneficiary
are that the decedent's executor may not be able to convey to the sur-
viving partner without running the risk of having unsatisfied creditors
or pretermitted heirs of the decedent surcharge him. There is also
the possibility of litigation over the sale price if it is not expressly and
clearly set out in the prior agreement. These pitfalls may be avoided
by having the survivor retain the right to withdraw from the proceeds
any amount required to satisfy the claims against decedent's estate.
After the time has run within which creditors can file claims against
" In Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), two brothers
set up identical trusts for each other, neither one reserving any rights to him-
self, but each giving the beneficiary the right to withdraw a certain amount
from the corpus during his lifetime. One of them died and the court upheld
the Commissioner in including the corpus in his gross estate, saying that the
person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor,
even though in form the trust is created by another. In a special ruling made
in 1947 the Commissioner said this did not apply to survivor-purchase agree-
ments. See 5 P-H 1947 FED. TAx Stav. 1 76,311 (1947).
21' Such a provision might raise the question whether the insured partner
has an incident of ownership by indirect control of the policy on his life. Such
control could arise by the threat of possible retaliation by the insured in chang-
ing the beneficiary in the policy he owns on his partner's life.
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the estate, and the personal representative has made a satisfactory con-
veyance of decedent's interest to the survivor, then the survivor can
assign his right of distribution under the policy to the wife. The only
trouble with this method is that while the proceeds are in the sur-
vivor's hands, they are liable for his debts. An alternative would be
to give the same rights to a trustee, and let him handle the transaction.
In any case, the use of settlement options should not interfere with
the basic plan.
Where the partnership is made the beneficiary and the agreement
provides that the proceeds will be used to purchase decedent's in-
terest, the payment to the estate will be included in decedent's gross
estate up to the value of the business interest purchased. As has been
said before, the fair market value of the business interest controls for
estate tax purposes, but if under a bona fide business agreement a
lesser amount were paid, this should be binding upon the Commission-
er.2 4  The only danger of making the partnership the beneficiary is
that the rule of Atkins v. Commissioner25 may be applied, to increase
the value of decedent's interest. In that case it was held that the
policies belonged to the partnership, and therefore, the proceeds be-
came an asset before they were turned over to decedent's estate.
Another possible beneficiary is a trust, with an agreement that the
trustee should use the proceeds to purchase decedent's share of the
business from the estate. The tax consequences are the same as if the
partnership were made the beneficiary, but possible advantages are
(1) that the Atkins case would probably not be applied, and (2) that
if the proceeds were unconditionally paid to the trustee for the purpose
of paying the estate, they would never have become a part of the
partnership assets and thus would not be subject to the claims of any
partnership creditors. To insure this result, the trustee should never
be one of the surviving partners.
The last, and probably the safest, beneficiary taxwise is the sur-
viving partner who owns the policy as an individual. He can use the
money to purchase decedent's interest according to the agreement,
has no income tax on the proceeds, 26 and can include the proceeds in
"4 See note 5 supra. But in Estate of Trammell v. Commissioner, 18 T. C.
662 (1952), and Estate of Gannon v. Commissioner, 21 T. C. No. 121 (1954),
the court said that although the agreement may be binding on the partners, it
was not binding on the Commissioner in fixing valuation of the estate for
estate tax purposes. In the Trammell case there was no binding agreement
that the decedent would not sell during his lifetime, but this provision did
exist in Gannon v. Comnssiomer. In both instances the surviving partner or
partners were given the option to purchase decedent's interest at a specified
valuation. Although the court made no mention of it, one reason for the de-
cisions might be the fact that in both cases the survivors were closely related
to decedent; his wife in one, and his brothers in the other.252 T. C. 332 (1943). " INT. REv. CODE § 101(a) (1).
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his cost basis, thus avoiding the result of the Legcdlet case. This
method would also avoid the possible application of the Atkins case,
but again there is the danger that the proceeds in the survivor's hands
will be subject to the claims of his creditors.
Under the cross-insurance plan, the decedent's estate will be left with
policies which the decedent owned on the lives of the survivors. Pro-
vision should be made in the agreement for their disposition to the in-
sured at the accrued cash value, or for their retention by the estate, in
which case they will be valued at their surrender or accrued cash value.
Under Section 22(b) (2) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, if the
policies were sold to the insured, the proceeds received by the bene-
ficiary less the purchase price and subsequently paid premiums would
have been subject to income tax. This has been changed by Section
101(a) (2) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which in such
situations excludes from gross income the entire amount of proceeds
if the transfer of the policy is to the insured, to a partner of the in-
sured, to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a cor-
poration in which the insured is a shareholder or officer.
The partners can set up a cross-ingurance plan also by transferring
to each other or to the partnership policies which they already hold
on their own lives, and under this new Code provision no taxation
of the proceeds will later result. This arrangement could save the
parties a large amount of money because they can take advantage of
the old premium rates, instead of having to take out new policies at
higher rates. Any inequities which might arise from the difference
in costs of the different premiums could be remedied by the partners
in the distribution of profits or in any other manner they saw fit.27 If
the policies contain double indemnity clauses, provision should also
be made for the disposition of the added proceeds in case the clause
comes into effect. This will avoid possible litigation between the de-
cedent's estate and the survivors,8
No matter what type of buy and sell agreement is used, if it is
funded by life insurance the agreement should not provide that a higher
price will be paid for a partner's interest upon his death than upon a
termination of his interest during life, as this would be an admission
that the parties are not actually agreeing to the true value of the busi-
ness interest, and are carrying personal life insurance under the name
of business life insurance.
17 In case one or more partner is not insurable, some plan may fie worked
out whereby his estate or beneficiary will get the proceeds from an annuity,
or annuities -paid for by the other partners, or by the partnership.
"See Tompkins v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 1054 (1949), where no pro-
vision was made for disposition of the added proceeds, but possible litigation
was avoided by the survivor when he paid them to decedent's estate.
1955]
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In a personal service partnership where the tangible assets are
limited, the members may wish to provide for the decedent's estate
by an agreement under which the estate is to receive a part of the
partnership income for a stated period, instead of one lump sum. It
is important that this agreement be written clearly so that it will be
understood that the decedent's estate is sharing in the partnership in-
come as a member,29 and that the payments do not constitute a purchase
of decedent's interest. If the latter situation is found to exist, the
entire income of the partnership will be taxed to the survivors,80
whereas a finding to the effect that the estate is sharing in the income
as a partner will allow the survivor to exclude from his gross income
the payments made to the estate. The estate in turn can take advan-
tage of Section 691(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
allows as a deduction from gross income the amount paid in estate
taxes because of the inclusion of the right to the income in the estate.
The agreement should provide that payments to the estate be in the
form of a percentage of current profits in order to strengthen the idea
that the payments are "income" to the estate. A plan under which
the estate is to receive a predetermined lump sum payment, or a
certain specified amount in each payment without regard to what the
actual partnership income amounts to may raise the suspicion of a
purchase.2 1 These arrangements should be drawn with great care in
order to reduce the danger of an adverse construction by the courts.
82
In drafting these agreements, there are five basic rules which, if
followed in planning a partnership buy and sell agreement, should give
the desired tax results:
"Coates v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 125 (1946).3 0Wilkins v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 519 (1946).
31 Compare the cases in notes 29 and 30, sitpra.
"2In a note in 47 COL. L. Rav. 289 (1947), the author suggests that the fol-
lowing provisions be included in the agreement for clarity:
(1) Recite clearly that the agreement is a substitution of the payments for a
precise accounting on uncollected fees, unfinished work, etc., in which the de-
ceased partner had an actual interest.
(2) If the state partnership laws permit, recite in the agreement that the es-
tate of the deceased partner is considered a partner; otherwise that the payments
over the period fixed are the equivalent of a formal winding up of the partner-
ship.
(3) Provide that the estate will share losses as well as profits.
(4) Avoid such terms as "sale," "purchase," "interest," "assets," and "payment
for good will"; conversely, use words like "profit," "share," and "gain and
loss."
(5) Make the amount payable contingent-a percentage of prospective profits
and losses.
(6) If the enterprise requires substantial capital, separate the capital account
and make it subject to a separate accounting. (The author seems to have di-
gressed from personal service partnerships in this suggestion.)
(7) After the death of the partner obtain a statement from his personal repre-
sentative that the amount which is paid is considered by him as income to the
estate.
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1. Although mutual options may be given the partners to purchase
or to liquidate upon the death of a partner, preferably the agree-
ment should bind the decedent's estate to sell, and the survivor
to purchase.
2. The agreement should provide a clear and definite basis for
evaluating the decedent's interest.
3. The sale of the decedent's business interest should be restricted
to the other partners during life as well as at death.
4. The agreement must preclude the sale of any partner's interest
during lifetime at a price higher than that payable at death. It
should not be a substitute for testamentary disposition.
5. The agreement should reflect a "business purpose."
6. The wills of the partners should be consistent with the agree-
ment and should direct the executors to carry out its terms.
JOHN J. DORTcH.
Torts-Application of Emergency Doctrine in North Carolina
The following charge by the trial court as it related to the applica-
tion of the doctrine of "sudden emergency" was approved by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in a recent case:'
"The Court instructs you that a person confronted with a
sudden emergency is not held by law to the same degree of care
as in ordinary circumstances, but only to that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person would use under similar
circumstances. The standard of conduct required in an emer-
gency, as elsewhere, is that of a prudent person.
The Court further instructs you that this principle is not
available to one who by his own negligence, brought about or
contributed to the emergency. That means, in simple language,
that a person who creates an emergency, or contributes to it,
cannot take advantage of the principle.
The Court further instructs you that one who is required
to act in an emergency is not held by law to the wisest choice
of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care
and prudence similarly situated would have made."
The purpose of the doctrine of sudden emergency has been well
stated by the West Virginia court :2
"The general principles which require one to act in such a
manner as to avoid injury to himself, and to take such steps to
IBarnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N. C. 721, 724, - S. E. 2d - (1954).
20ldfield v. Woodall, 113 W. Va. 35, 37, 166 S. E. 691, 692 (1932).
